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Abstract: The US Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. is widely 
seen as a landmark in the law of jurisdictional party autonomy. Where earlier American courts 
had rejected forum-selection clauses as ‘ousters’ of jurisdiction and therefore as against public 
policy, the Supreme Court now firmly came out in their favour, and Chief Justice Burger’s 
resounding rejections of ‘parochialism’ in his opinion for the court have often been cited since. 
This brief Comment revisits the decision, arguing that The Bremen should be understood not as 
a mere statement of principle or change in doctrine, but as a particularly striking instance of 
worldmaking. The Comment discusses in particular: (a) the constructive roles of ‘scale’ and 
scalar modulation as techniques of worldmaking, and (b) some paradoxes in the character of 
the world of private party autonomy that the decision helped imagine and make real. 
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I. REVISITING A CLASSIC:  
THE BREMEN V. ZAPATA OFF-SHORE CO. 
 
Going back to the US Supreme Court’s decision in The Bremen, means recounting 
one of the classic origin stories in the modern conflict of laws canon. That story – 
part of a well-known broader narrative of the rise of party autonomy - goes like 
this.  
 US courts were historically hostile to forum-selection clauses agreed between 
private parties. This hostility, as the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit put it in 
a 1958 decision, reflected ‘the universally accepted rule that agreements in advance 
of controversy whose object is to oust the jurisdiction of the courts are contrary to 
public policy and will not be enforced’.1 This so-called ‘ouster doctrine’ was 
applied ‘with almost boring unanimity’,2 until the Supreme Court abruptly changed 
course in its 1972 decision in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. Overturning 
another Fifth Circuit decision, the Supreme Court now held that the party resisting 
enforcement of a clause stipulating litigation in a foreign court would have to 
show that trial abroad would be ‘so manifestly and gravely inconvenient’ that they 
would ‘be effectively deprived of a meaningful day in court’. In reaching this 
conclusion, Chief Justice Burger’s opinion for the court invoked the following 
stirring lines, often cited later: 
 
‘The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged 
if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all 
disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts (…). We cannot 
have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters 
exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws and resolved in our courts’.3  
 
This familiar, conventional, history becomes puzzling when looked at more 
closely, from two directions. First, if today party autonomy in international 
commercial litigation is so widely accepted and so thoroughly normalised, how 
could it have taken until the 1970s for the US Supreme Court to fully affirm the 
validity of forum selection clauses? Secondly, though, if before The Bremen party 
autonomy was so widely and stridently rejected – ‘with almost boring unanimity’ –, 
how can it be that all these earlier judicial objections seem to have disappeared so 
completely since the case was decided? How, in other words, could there have 
                                                      
1 Carbon Black Export Inc. v. The Monrosa, 254 F. 2d 297 (1958), petition for certiorari dismissed, 359 U.S. 
180 (1959). 
2 Friedrich K. Juenger, Supreme Court Validation of Forum-Selection Clauses, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 49, 52 (1972), 
quoting Comment, Agreements in Advance Conferring Exclusive Jurisdiction on Foreign Courts, 10 LA. L. REV. 293 
(1950). 
3 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972). All further unattributed quotations are from 
Chief Justice Burger’s opinion for the court in this case. 
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been such a rapid and decisive shift from forum-selection clauses as ‘against public 
policy’, to party autonomy as the new orthodoxy?  
 The first of these two questions invites us to revisit the longer history of 
jurisdictional party autonomy in the US. Revisionist work in this vein has shown 
that federal courts had been giving effect to forum selection clauses long before 
The Bremen, not only in admiralty cases, but also as part of forum non conveniens 
assessments in land-based courts.4 The case of The Bremen itself, in fact, only went 
to the Supreme Court because of a persistent conflict over the appropriate effect 
of forum-selection clauses between the Second and Fifth Circuit Federal Appeals 
Courts. On this revised view, the decision remains interesting as a rhetorically 
rousing endorsement, and as a useful practical confirmation of the validity of 
forum selection clauses at the Supreme Court level. But if in reality the battle for 
jurisdictional party autonomy was a much more gradual, affair, then the case 
becomes less relevant as a matter of either normative principle or doctrinal 
change.  
 This revised history is important, but it is not complete. Contemporary 
writers did, after all, see The Bremen as an important case. The decision was widely 
commented on in law journals, not only in the US but also in England. And it was 
expected that the court’s ruling could well ‘substantially affect counselling and 
drafting practices’.5 This suggests that by the early 1970s, there were still real issues 
of principle and doctrine to be settled. 
 What about our second question, on limitations on party autonomy in the 
period since 1972? Later Supreme Court decisions have been striking, notably, for 
how they made The Bremen ‘stand for the broadest possible principle that its 
language [could] support’.6 The Bremen’s reasonableness test was ‘watered-down’, 
and its policy of favouring forum-selection clauses extended also to consumer 
contracts.7 More generally, this Supreme Court case law was clearly only one 
strand in a much broader wave of projects – of Conventions, Restatements, and 
model legislation - expanding party autonomy in interstate and international 
commercial dealings, not just in the US but also in Europe and elsewhere.8 And 
so, while The Bremen was, in 1972, still seen by some as ‘a most internationally 
                                                      
4 David Marcus, The Perils of Contract Procedure: A Revised History of Forum Selection Clauses in the Federal Courts, 
82 TULANE LAW REVIEW 973 (2008). 
5 Juenger (1972), 50. 
6 Edward A. Purcell Jr., Geography as a Litigation Weapon: Consumers, Forum-Selection Clauses, and the Rehnquist 
Court, 40 UCLA LAW REVIEW 423, 429 (1992). 
7 Ibid. 
8 See, e.g., the 1955 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to International Sales of Goods; the 1958 
New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (ratified by the 
US on 30 September 1970, just months before the hearing in The Bremen); the 1968 Model Choice of 
Forum Act adopted by the US National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws; the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (adopted in 1971); and, in Europe, the 1980 Rome Convention 
on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (work on which had begun in 1967). 
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minded decision’,9 that openness has since not only been expanded - it has 
become commonplace.10  
 
 
II. A WORLD OF ‘WORLD MARKETS’, REAL AND IMAGINED 
 
So how are we to understand the place of The Bremen in the broader history of 
modern private international law? In this Comment, I suggest an alternative 
reading of the case, as not simply a doctrinal step or as a mere statement of 
principle, but as an instance of ‘worldmaking’.11 Chief Justice Burger’s opinion is 
an exceptionally striking and momentous instance of what Clifford Geertz in his 
work on law has called ‘imagining the real’.12 The opinion, quite explicitly, 
imagines a world – a particular kind of world – and in so doing helps bring that 
world into being. When the Chief Justice situates the case in ‘an era of expanding 
world trade and commerce’, or when he refers to the ostensible needs of ‘trade 
and commerce in world markets’, for example, these statements have to be 
understood as not merely descriptive, but also as generative and constitutive. The 
decision participates in the construction of one among many possible ‘world 
versions’ – in this case, one revolving around a fear of ‘parochialism’ and concern 
for ‘the future development of international commercial dealings by Americans’. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in The Bremen, I want to argue, is ultimately most 
important for its imaginative construction and description of this world, and - still 
following Geertz – for its part in the ‘organized effort to make the description 
correct’.13 
 The world imagined in The Bremen, moreover, is of a particular character. It is, 
or at least is projected to be, distinctly modern. This is suggested by a number of 
aspects of the symbolic and technical resources manipulated in the opinion and 
the surrounding scholarly commentary. Take the uses of history, for example. At 
the Fifth Circuit, a dissenting opinion by Judge Wisdom expressed concern that 
the majority of this normally ‘forward-looking court’ was taking ‘a backward step’ 
                                                      
9 George A. Zaphiriou, Choice of Forum and Choice of Law Clauses in International Commercial Agreements, 3(2) 
MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 311, 321 (1978).  
10 Peter Nygh, AUTONOMY IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS (1999), (freedom of parties to international 
contracts to choose their forum and their applicable law ‘today [in 1999] almost universally 
acknowledged’). See also: Giesela Rühl, Party Autonomy in the Private International Law of Contracts: 
Transatlantic Convergence and Economic Efficiency, in: Eckart Gottschalk, Ralf Michaels, Giesela Rühl, Jan von 
Hein (eds.), CONFLICT OF LAWS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD (2007). 
11 Cf. Nelson Goodman, WAYS OF WORLDMAKING (1978). See also David Delaney, THE SPATIAL, THE 
LEGAL AND THE PRAGMATICS OF WORLD-MAKING: NOMOSPHERIC INVESTIGATIONS (2010); Clifford 
Geertz, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective, in: LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS 
IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY (1983), 167. For an application of these ideas in the field of 
constitutional law, see Martin Loughlin The Constitutional Imagination, 78(1) MODERN LAW REVIEW 1 
(2015). 
12 Geertz (1983), 173.  
13 Ibid., 174. 
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which had ‘no place in a shrinking world’.14 Judge Wisdom was also keen to 
emphasise how ‘[t]he towing of an oil rig across the Atlantic was a new business’; 
another reason for a modern approach to its legal regulation.15 At the Supreme 
Court, the theretofore powerful ‘ouster doctrine’ was relegated to a realm of 
‘vestigial legal fiction’. In this way, a clear break is suggested with a pre-modern 
past still in thrall to ‘taboos’, ‘word magic’, and the ‘hypnotic power of the phrase 
“oust the jurisdiction”.16 This process of deliberate forgetting also played a role in 
facilitating the construction of a new, modern world. At the same time, the 
Supreme Court was concerned to give forum-selection-clause enforcement a firm 
footing in another modernity: that of the liberal tradition, when Chief Justice 
Burger noted how the new approach accorded ‘with ancient concepts of freedom 
of contract’. The decision, in short, set up a clear victory, of forward-looking 
sensitivity to new business needs combined with liberal principle, on the one hand, 
over mere ‘unthinking adherence to spurious precedent’, on the other.17 
 
 
III. MATTERS OF SCALE 
 
Here, though, I want to focus on one other particularly striking aspect of the way 
the decision in The Bremen imagines - and contributes to the construction of – a 
world it purports merely to describe. This is the manipulation of the symbols and 
techniques of scale. Chief Justice Burger’s opinion produces a shift towards a 
‘global’ sphere, as the natural and appropriate level at which jurisdictional conflicts 
such as those at issue in the case ought to be negotiated. World-making, in short, 
carries a particular literalness here. A comparison between Burger’s opinion and 
the decision of the majority at the Fifth Circuit can help clarify what this shift 
entailed.  
 The outlook of the Court of Appeals was distinctly inter-national, in a classical 
sense. This is to say that for the Fifth Circuit, geography, national jurisdictional 
boundaries, and the interests of states were still the natural points of reference. In 
this court’s reasoning, local connections were still of primary significance. This was 
true, firstly, for connections to the US. Note how the Fifth Circuit describes what 
had happened: ‘Though the towage contract envisioned a long voyage with 
potential exposure to the jurisdiction of numerous states, the flotilla [that is: the 
towing tug Bremen, and the rig Chaparral] never escaped the Fifth Circuit’s mare 
                                                      
14 Circuit Judge Wisdom, dissenting in In the Matter of the Complaint of Unterweser Reederei, GmbH. Zapata Off-
Shore Co. v. M/S Bremen and Unterweser Reederei, GmbH.,  446 F. 2d 907 (28 June 1971), quoting Comment, 
Application of the Forum Clause to Commercial Contracts, 8 HOUSTON L. REV. 739, 752 (1971).  
15 Judge Wisdom, quoted in Chief Justice Burger’s opinion, at fn. 14. 
16 ‘Taboo’ was Learned Hand’s term (see Krenger v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 174 F.2d 556 (1949), quoted in The 
Bremen); ‘hypnotic power’ was Jerome Frank’s (see Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 
978, 984 (1942); ‘word magic’ was Friedrich Juenger’s (see Juenger (1972), 53). 
17 Ibid. 
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nostrum, and the casualty occurred in close proximity to the district court’.18 But it 
was also true for connections to other states. As the court set out the position: 
‘The only other nation having significant contacts with, or interest in, the 
controversy is Germany. England's only relationship is the designation of her 
courts in the forum clause’.19  
 At the Supreme Court, these understandings of proximity and interest 
undergo a remarkable shift. The precise location of the accident no longer matters. 
It is as if the Court wants to give immediate practical relevance to its more 
rhetorical declaration that ‘[t]he barrier of distance that once tended to confine a 
business concern to a modest territory no longer does so’, by disqualifying such 
geographical connections as ‘mere fortuities’. The fact that the claimant was a 
United States citizen, whose substantive rights would be affected if the dispute 
were to be litigated in England, also is no longer a relevant factor. Similarly, the 
potential ‘interests’ of England or Germany are no longer mentioned. Neither, 
strikingly, is any specific interest of the United States as a whole, on which more 
below. In the approach taken by the Supreme Court, connections to particular 
localities are only taken into account in attenuated form, as part of an overall 
‘reasonableness’ inquiry. And so, instead of attention to geographical proximity or 
concern for local governmental interests, we see rather deference to the 
expectations of private parties. Private parties, moreover, of a particular kind: 
those businesses ‘once essentially local’, but now operating ‘in world markets’.20  
 This escalation of what Mariana Valverde has called ‘the spatial scale of 
governance’,21 to a global level, is accompanied – and perhaps facilitated - by a 
parallel elevation in terms of the sources for the court’s authority. Part of this is a 
greater willingness to look to foreign judicial practice on this issue, in particular 
‘the approach followed in other common law countries, including England’. But 
even more important is the source of the Court’s authority within US law itself. 
Recall that The Bremen concerned claims brought in admiralty. Chief Justice 
Burger’s opinion contains no statement whatsoever on the basis or the intended 
scope of the Court’s new ruling. It would therefore have been entirely plausible to 
read the Supreme Court’s validation of forum-selection clauses as confined to 
admiralty litigation. But contemporary commentators were not content to read the 
judgment in such a limited way. Instead, they argued that the Court had in fact 
done something it does only comparatively rarely: it had laid down a rule of federal 
common law, based on a federal interest in ‘maintaining an effective climate in 
which to conduct international commercial activity’.22 After all, any ‘lack of 
                                                      
18 Circuit Judge Gerwin, in: In The Matter of the Complaint of Unterweser Reederei, GmbH. Zapata Off-Shore Co. v. 
M/S Bremen and Unterweser Reederei, GmbH. 428 F.2d 888 (19 June 1970). 
19 Ibid. 
20 Cf. Joel R. Paul, The Transformation of International Comity, 71 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 19-38 
(Summer 2008). 
21 Mariana Valverde, CHRONOTOPES OF LAW: JURISDICTION, SCALE AND GOVERNANCE (2015), 33. 
22 Harold G. Maier, The Three Faces of Zapata: Maritime Law, Federal Common Law, Federal Courts Law, 6 
VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 387, 394 (1973). See also Juenger (1972), 59. 
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predictability created by a diversity of rules on the validity of forum-selection 
clauses’, one writer noted, would ‘impinge on the nation as a whole, not only those 
states that might decide to refuse enforcement’.23 More generally, ‘[t]he limited 
political context’ in which state-level decision-makers operated, would be ‘an 
inappropriate one in which to make a policy judgment concerning the importance 
of effective forum selection by the parties to international commercial dealings’.24 
Determining the validity of forum-selection clauses, then, was not a matter that 
could be safely left to state law. The Bremen had to be read as laying down a rule of 
federal common law, applicable not just in admiralty but – at least - also to all 
other international transactions. 
 Now, it could well be thought, certainly from today’s perspective, that 
describing these apparently simple manipulations of scale as ‘world-making’, is 
reading too much into the court’s decision. All this might amount to, after all, 
could be some innocent judicial references to ‘world trade and commerce’, ‘world 
markets’, and some rhetorical flourishes of a court concerned to show it is mindful 
of ‘the expanding horizons of American contractors who seek business in all parts 
of the world’. But if we place this rhetoric in context, such a deeper significance 
may well appear less far-fetched. The court’s terminology, and the outlook it 
signalled were, in effect, largely new at the time. It was precisely during the few 
years leading up the decision in The Bremen, that economists, political scientists, 
and international relations scholars, began to address the need not only for 
‘transnational’ or ‘global’ perspectives in their fields, but also for increased 
recognition of the specific role of corporations at such ‘transnational’ or ‘global’ 
levels. ‘American Business Abroad’, published in 1969, for example, saw MIT 
economist Charles Kindleberger arguing that the nation state was ‘just about 
through as an economic unit’.25 In ‘The Tortuous Evolution of the Multinational 
Corporation’ (also 1969), Howard V. Perlmutter coined the neologism ‘geocentric’, 
to describe a new breed of super-sized ‘world oriented’ firms having lost ‘all 
special ties to one or two particular states’.26 And a Harvard Business School study 
on ‘The Role of U.S. Enterprise Abroad’, (again 1969), cautioned that the identity of 
multinational corporations was ‘likely to become more and more ambiguous in 
national terms’ over time.27 An early, and especially grand, statement of this new 
mood can be found, finally, in a 1966 book entitled ‘World Politics: The Global 
System’ by Herbert Spiro, professor of political science at the University of 
                                                      
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., 396. 
25 Charles Kindleberger, AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD (1969), 207.  
26 See Howard V. Perlmutter, The Tortuous Evolution of the Multinational Corporation, 4(1) COLUMBIA 
JOURNAL OF WORLD BUSINESS (1969), 9-18, quoted in: Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Robert O. 
Keohane,  Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction, 25(3) INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 
(1971), 329-349. For an overview with extensive further sources, see Jonathan F. Galloway, Worldwide 
Corporations and International Integration: The Case of INTELSAT, 24(3) INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 
(1970), 503-519. 
27 Raymond Vernon, The Role of U.S. Enterprise Abroad, 98(1) DAEDALUS (1969), 129.  
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Pennsylvania. ‘Today for the first time in history,’ Spiro began his book, ‘a global 
community of mankind exists or, at any rate, is coming into existence in the 
consciousness of human beings’: ‘Today there is one global political system of 
which all national and other smaller political systems are component parts’.28  
 These references of course do not, without more, prove anything. But they 
do at least suggest that thinking in ‘world’-terms was both prevalent, and to some 
extent new, at least in scholarly circles, at precisely the time Chief Justice Burger 
wrote his opinion in The Bremen, where he adopted a very similar outlook and cast 
it in very similar language.    
 As Mariana Valverde, Boaventura de Sousa Santos, and others have argued, 
questions of scale matter for the character of governance projects. The Bremen, in 
an important sense, introduced a ‘global’ perspective for the resolution of 
jurisdictional conflicts, to replace a more conventional inter-nationalist comparison 
of contacts and interests of specific local jurisdictions. Is it too far-fetched to say 
that in doing so, the decision participated in a remaking of the world – or at least 
of those aspects of the world concerned with the demarcation of public authority 
and private autonomy? One noted political science scholar commented in 1968 
that, given the role of corporations as important actors ‘in present and future 
international systems … their political functions as structural components of 
systems of world politics [could] only be neglected at our peril’.29 In this light, 
recall once more the assertion at the heart of Chief Justice Burger’s case for party 
autonomy: ‘[w]e cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and 
international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws and resolved in 
our courts’ (emphases added). This statement, for all its intended obviousness, 
leaves many questions unanswered. ‘Why not?’ is one. ‘Perhaps not “exclusively”, 
but surely still commonly, or at least regularly?’ is another. And even more 
importantly: ‘Who are “we” in this statement?’. In whose name is Chief Justice 
Burger speaking here? Can the interests of American businesses operating 
internationally simply be assumed to be congruent with some general public 
interest? Or is the court going even further, and taking into consideration not such 
American business interests, but also those of some nascent global business 
community? 
 
  
                                                      
28 Quoted in George Modelski, The Promise of Geocentric Politics   (Book Review), 22(4) World Politics 
(1970), 617, 623.   
29 George Modelski, The Corporation in World Society, (1968) YEARBOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS, 78, quoted in 
Galloway (1970), 505. 
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IV. WORLDMAKING BEFORE CRITIQUE: THE BREMEN AND 
LEGAL MODERNISM 
 
Even if this world-making perspective sounds plausible generally, why go back to 
The Bremen specifically, and why do so today? Surely all that can be said about this 
decision of almost fifty years ago, has been said already? Perhaps surprisingly, one 
important reason for asking these questions today, is that they could not be raised, 
or at least not in this way, at the time. Recall that the case was argued and decided 
at the very beginning of the 1970s. This means that Chief Justice Burger’s opinion 
arrived just before a range of major disciplinary innovations in a number of highly 
relevant domains – from Foucauldian studies of governmentality, to geography 
and critical legal studies. ‘In the 1960s the world changed (…). In the 1970s the 
disciplines changed’, David Delaney has written in his overview of the relationship 
between law and space - a theme of great salience to the case.30 Even if it is true 
that no single idea is ever entirely new, looking at societal phenomena, such as 
social space or the distinction between private freedom and public authority, as 
socially constructed, was greatly facilitated through the use of conceptual and 
normative tools introduced in disciplinary innovations that took place largely later, 
over the course of the 1970s and then during the 1980s.31  
 It is true that still today, the constructive, structuring, and meaning-making 
dimensions of party autonomy are not often addressed explicitly in conflict of laws 
scholarship. There are of course exceptions.32 One notable example is the 
argument developed by the legal historian Edward Purcell, that the Supreme 
Court’s later, post-The Bremen case law on forum-selection clauses resembles its 
early twentieth-century ‘liberty of contract’ jurisprudence, in ‘[p]rivileging a 
particular view of the bases of national economic power and assuming the 
innocence of private social power’.33 But the position of The Bremen itself is 
particularly interesting, still today, because it offers us a glimpse of worldmaking 
before critique – of a time when fewer tools were readily available to unpack ideas 
on, say, ‘the expansion of American business and industry’, or on how - exactly - it 
would be ‘parochial’ to insist on local law or courts, and on why - exactly - that 
would be problematic. Intriguingly, the decision also came just before the 
ascendancy of another external perspective from which it could have been 
                                                      
30 Delaney (2010), 9-10. See also Valverde (2015), 48 (‘legal geography did not exist as a field in the 
1980s’). 
31  Sceptics might point to the early twentieth-century scholar Robert Hale, and argue that many of these 
ideas had been around for a while. And they had been, to a degree, and in a form. But it is intriguing to 
note that even Hale’s work had to be ‘rediscovered’ later, and that, again, much of this rediscovery 
occurred only after the early 1970s. See, e.g., Warren J. Samuels, The Economy as a System of Power and its 
Legal Bases: The Legal Economics of Robert Lee Hale, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 261 (1973). 
32 For an illuminating exception, see Fleur Johns, Performing Party Autonomy, LAW AND CONTEMPORARY 
PROBLEMS (Summer 2008), 253 (adopting a focus on ‘the background-structuring effects of the notion of 
party autonomy’). 
33 Purcell (1992), 507. 
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subjected to scrutiny, albeit most likely with radically different implications: the 
analysis of efficiency in US law & economics scholarship.34 Again, crucial 
assumptions in the decision that went untested at the time – such as the 
suggestion that this was an era in which ‘all courts’ were ‘overloaded’ – would 
most probably have been scrutinised to a greater degree, had the case been 
decided perhaps only ten years later.35  
 Partly because of simple timing, then, The Bremen could be – and, to some 
extent, was - an exercise in construction without critique, in world-making without 
self-reflection. Its faith in freedom for commercial actors, in internationalism, and 
in ‘reasonableness’, all mark the decision as an instance of modernist legalism, and 
perhaps even as one of its high points. This is true in particular of the confidence 
in the force of sheer rationality that surrounded the court’s reasoning. As Friedrich 
Juenger noted at the time, speculation as to whether the court’s new rule on forum 
selection would also bind state courts - a question simply not addressed in The 
Bremen - was likely to be irrelevant: after all, now that the court had concisely set 
out ‘the reasons for upholding party autonomy … it would be difficult for a state 
court to escape its logic’.36 Using only such logic and law, and overcoming ‘taboos’ 
and ‘parochialism’, the US Supreme Court in The Bremen helped build a modern 
world of party autonomy – all without once mentioning that term once. The 
tensions and paradoxes inherent in this world, between private and public 
freedom, perhaps could not readily have been expressed and analysed in these 
terms at the time.37 But they are certainly still with us today. And one of these 
paradoxes still stands as perhaps the starkest monument to Chief Justice Burger’s 
modern, internationalist optimism. It would not be possible, Burger wrote, to have 
world commerce on exclusively American terms. That was why party autonomy 
was said to be necessary. But that is also, in the decades since The Bremen, largely 
what party autonomy has produced, as New York and English law, and the New 
York and English courts, have become the default choices for international 
contracting in ‘world markets’. The impulse of internationalism, then, and the 
effect of hegemony have turned out to be merely two sides of the same coin. 
                                                      
34 The seminal early event here is the 1973 publication of Richard Posner’s ‘Economic Analysis of Law’.  
35 See, e.g., the vast literature on the so-called ‘litigation explosion’ in the US, emerging from the second 
half of the 1980s. 
36 Juenger (1972), 59. See also the 1971 ‘Comment’, cited in Judge Wisdom’s dissent in The Bremen 
(arguing that it was ‘difficult to imagine any court long rejecting a criterion which is universally referred to 
as the "reasonableness" test’). 
37 For the notion of ‘public freedom’, see Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93(6) HARVARD LAW 
REVIEW 1057 (1980). 
